This email contains today’s Daily Communiqu © from Barnabas Fund’s website. Recent communiqu ©s have covered the following subjects:

IRAQ – THE IRANIAN GAME.

IRAQ – IMPACT OF LEBANESE CRISIS.

IRAQ – BASRA: SHI‘A MILITIAS AND BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH.

IRAQ – THE ROLE OF SHI‘A MILITIAS.

To see these communiqu ©s click this link http://www.barnabasfund.org/archivenews/country.php?news_country=DAILY%20COMMUNIQUE

IRAQ – PROGNOSIS AND SCENARIOS

A recently leaked memo to the British Prime Minister from William Patey, the outgoing British ambassador to Iraq, indicates a growing pessimism about the situation in that country. According to Patey, civil war is more likely to develop than a stable democracy. He also predicts the possible break-up of Iraq along ethnic/religious lines. His prognosis is that Iraq will remain messy and difficult for another five to ten years. Patey also warns that the greatest danger to stability in Iraq and the possible trigger for civil war and anarchy are Muqtada al-Sadr, his movement and his Mahdi Army as they develop into a state-within-a-state, similar to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Top US generals, John Abizaid and Peter Pace echoed similar fears when briefing the US Senate Armed Services Committee.

There is now no doubt that the Samarra bombing of the Shi‘a al-‘Askari shrine in February 2006 was a definite tipping point in the Iraqi scene. Any hope of radical Sunni and Shi‘a Islamists uniting on a joint anti-American platform was dashed as the communities turned against each other. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, the Sunni insurgents’ most likely ally, led the vicious attacks on Sunni mosques and civilians in response to the destruction of one of the holiest Shi’a shrines. There was a steep rise in the killing of Sunnis by Shi‘a militias and security forces (death squads) linked to them as Shi‘a desire for revenge at the continual Sunni jihadi outrages against them finally burst the dams of communal self control previously imposed by Ayatollah al-Sistani.

Iraq is fast moving to a sectarian civil war, sectarian cleansing and a division of the country into its basic Arab Sunni, Arab Shi‘a and Kurdish components. Baghdad and a few other highly mixed centres will remain as islands within which sectarian quarters are clearly isolated and segregated from each other. A weak and ineffective central government, dominated by the Shi‘a Islamist parties will continue to give Iraq some international legitimacy, but will have no real power.

The main institutions and ministries as well as the security forces of the central government are being infiltrated by the Shi‘a militias and their supporters. Their triumph is converting the democratic structure of the new institutions into empty shells. The disarming of the militias declared by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki does not seem likely to be implemented.

The Sunni north will be secured by a combination of Sunni Ba‘athist, jihadi and local Sunni vigilante groups; the Shi‘a south by the Shi‘a militias; and the Kurdish region by the Peshmergas. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is constantly pushing for a federal grand Shi‘a Province in the south, and with the backing of his powerful al-Badr militia this is what is actually developing. Real power will then lie in the provincial government centres, not in the central government.

While the sectarian fighting goes on, the other power struggle in the Shi‘a areas, such as in Basra, is about local power and access to resources between the various Shi‘a parties and their militias. SCIRI, Sadrists, Da‘wa, Fadhila are all jockeying for power, influence and resources in the areas they control, and there are constantly changing alliances and conflicts. Points are gained by the ability to prove their heroism in the fight against the Sunni insurgents as well as in the fight against the US-led allies, especially the British forces in the South. Control of assets such as city quarters, oil installations, powers stations, factories, etc. are important too. Alliances with local tribes and their forces are also significant and ever changing.

The question is whether the very disparate forces in Iraq, Sunni, Shi‘a and Kurdish, will in the long term – a question of years, not months – be able to forge a new Iraqi national agreement that will mirror the reality on the ground rather than the utopian ideals of the new constitution. Much violence and bloodshed will occur before any such deal can be made, accepted and implemented. Sunnis must accept their new status as a small minority of some 20% (many still claim they represent 35% of the population) in a multi-communal Iraq. Some observers think it could take a generation for this community to adjust to its new weaker status. Much will also depend on the regional balance of power being forged anew in the broader Middle East at this time, especially that between Shi‘a Iran and its allies and Sunni Saudi Arabia and its allies. The Lebanon crisis has simply accelerated trends already in flux. The Shi‘a parties and militias have all come out fervently in support of Lebanese Hizbullah, whose roots and ideology are identical to their own. It is evident that in the long run, despite pragmatic dependence on US and allied forces, their hearts lie with Iran and its radical Shi‘a ideologies. Iran is thus playing for high stakes, and seemingly cannot lose: either it gains a new Shi‘a dominated Iraq as an ally, or a truncated Shi‘a federal state or autonomous province in South Iraq even more closely tied to Iran.

The more Iran comes under US and international pressure to stop its nuclear enrichment programme and limit its regional ambitions, the more it is likely to fight the US where it is most vulnerable, namely in Iraq. It will certainly secure its interests in Iraq’s oil-rich south by supporting its Shi‘a Iraqi proxies in South Iraq.

Copyright  © Barnabas Fund – 11th August 2006

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