Sightings 5/5/2011

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— Megan Doherty

In his April 1  ¢â‚¬Å“Brainstorm ¢â‚¬  blog post in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*,
University of Washington professor of psychology David Barash offered a
 ¢â‚¬Å“modest proposal ¢â‚¬ :  ¢â‚¬Å“Indeed, I propose that it is high time for the
electorate to reject *anyone* who is strenuously devout. ¢â‚¬  The substance of
the post is a poor attempt at re-inventing the wheel when it comes to
arguing that the proper relationship between religion and politics is no
relationship at all.

Barash asserts (and nowhere offers a reasoned argument) that religiously
devout people have no business getting involved in politics. Given the
auspicious date of the post, and the  ¢â‚¬Å“modest proposal ¢â‚¬  reference, I
cautiously fired off an email, asking if, perhaps, this was meant as a joke,
or a satire of some sort. Although he was very kind to respond ¢â‚¬”and
quickly ¢â‚¬”the answer was troubling:  ¢â‚¬Å“A bit of tongue-in-cheek, but
simultaneously serious. ¢â‚¬ 

A bit? What he zeroed in on as  ¢â‚¬Å“evidence ¢â‚¬  for his proposal is revealing. He
first mentions a commander of the Spanish Armada who, in 1588,  ¢â‚¬Å“reasoned ¢â‚¬ 
(his quotes) that he and his ship were setting sail with the will of God on
their side ¢â‚¬”an early instance of  ¢â‚¬Å“faith-based foreign policy. ¢â‚¬  What Barash
fails to consider about this reference is perhaps too obvious to mention:
the sixteenth century was a very different world. It *was* perfectly
 ¢â‚¬Å“reasonable ¢â‚¬  at the time not only to be a religious believer, but to believe
that you are on the right side of the divine plan. More to the point, the
implication of his use of scare quotes around  ¢â‚¬Å“reasoned ¢â‚¬  is that religion
and reason are mutually exclusive. In the vein of David Hume, the
eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, Barash seems to hold that if you
are religious then, by definition, you cannot be reasonable, and that the
only rational thing to do is to divest oneself of religious beliefs.

Barash then jumps ahead to 9/11, and warns of the catastrophic results of
George W. Bush ¢â‚¬â„¢s  ¢â‚¬Å“faith-based ¢â‚¬  policy, rooted in his conviction that he was
 ¢â‚¬Å“acting on God ¢â‚¬â„¢s will ¢â‚¬  by invading Iraq. Not only was 9/11 a dramatic
example of why religion and politics don ¢â‚¬â„¢t mix from *our* end, but he also
points to  ¢â‚¬Å“Islamic jihadists ¢â‚¬  as further proof. While I am in no wise
jumping to the defense of Bush ¢â‚¬â„¢s foreign policy, this provocative and
polemical example illustrates the numerous unfounded assumptions and
confusions that provide the scaffolding of Barash ¢â‚¬â„¢s claims.

Barash seems to assume that there are only two logical options: religion as
completely separate from politics, and politics as religiously *partial* ¢â‚¬”that
is, political decisions made primarily on the basis of one ¢â‚¬â„¢s religious
beliefs. There is, of course, a third option, namely that political
decisions may be *informed* by one ¢â‚¬â„¢s religious convictions, just as they are
informed by any number of other things that comprise who one is as an
individual. Following close on the heels of this assumption is another:
Barash seems to elide the important difference between informing as just *one
contributing factor* and *justifying* something *solely on the basis of*.
What he seems to take issue with ¢â‚¬”and I would argue, rightly ¢â‚¬”is what he takes
to be (some) politicians ¢â‚¬â„¢ *final justification* for a political decision on
the basis of their religion, such that the *claims* or *assertions* of one ¢â‚¬â„¢s
religion are taken as *self-justifying*.

Now we get to the heart of the matter, the old  ¢â‚¬Å“public v. private ¢â‚¬  chestnut.
Barash ¢â‚¬â„¢s case seems fundamentally based on the premise that the public
sphere of politics is the realm of rational discourse, and religion, being a
private matter of individual conscience, is not open to rational debate or
argument. I take no issue with the implicit premise that politics is part of
the public forum, and that rational discussion is requisite for admission to
that realm. However, Barash denies that religious beliefs are open to
rational debate, and he makes this point quite clear: what he wants in a
politician is  ¢â‚¬Å“someone whose views are reason- and reality-based, founded on
good, hard thought instead of theological doctrine[.] Instead of someone who
prays, what about someone who *thinks*? ¢â‚¬  What this quote shows is not only
that prayer and theological doctrine are antithetical to reason and
thinking, but also that religion is not remotely  ¢â‚¬Å“reality-based. ¢â‚¬ 

There seem to be more assumptions curled up in here that I could unpack such
as his implicit, narrow definition of  ¢â‚¬Å“reason ¢â‚¬  as
*solely*scientific-empirical and instrumental-technological; his tacit
claim that
because religion *is* *false*, religious belief *is* *irrational *(thereby
begging the question against religion from the outset); and lumping
*all*religions of the world together as presumably being theistic,
fundamentalist
and absolutist.

While not all people (religious or otherwise) think that religion is open to
rational argumentation, such a perspective is crucial to making the case
that religion is not inherently antithetical to politics; rather, pursuing
rational debate *about* one ¢â‚¬â„¢s religious beliefs and their consequences is *
required*. Just as rational public discourse requires the disestablishment
of religion, this same disestablishment in turn requires that religion
retain access to the sphere of public argument. Rather than, as Barash says,
there being  ¢â‚¬Å“not enough ¢â‚¬  prejudice against the  ¢â‚¬Å“overtly ¢â‚¬  religious in
politics, my own  ¢â‚¬Å“hope of a miracle ¢â‚¬  is that otherwise intelligent members
of the public, such as himself, will remember the principles of the
Enlightenment that guided this country ¢â‚¬â„¢s founders (who themselves saw
religion as a thorough-going rational affair): above all else, tolerance.

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*References

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David Barash,  ¢â‚¬Å“A Modest Proposal  ¢â‚¬Ëœin the Confident Hope of a
Miracle<http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/a-modest-proposal-%E2%80%9Cin-the-confident-hope-of-a-miracle%E2%80%9D/33832?sid=pm&utm_source=pm&utm_medium=en>, ¢â‚¬â„¢ ¢â‚¬ 
*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 1, 2011.

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*Megan Doherty* holds a PhD in the philosophy of religions from the
University of Chicago, where she was the 2010-2011 Alma Wilson Lecturer in
Religious Studies.

———-

Can American Muslims be both loyal to their tradition and full participants
in American civil society? In this month ¢â‚¬â„¢s Religion & Culture Web
Forum<http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/webforum/032011/Moerman.pdf>,
Vincent J. Cornell argues that an embrace of the tenets of Shari ¢â‚¬Ëœa
fundamentalism has led even would-be moderate Muslim leaders to reject the
principles of American constitutional democracy. Consequently, they advocate
(often unintentionally) a retreat from full participation in American civil
society into sectarianism and  ¢â‚¬Å“millet multiculturalism. ¢â‚¬  Against this tend,
says Cornell, it is necessary for Muslim thinkers to find an  ¢â‚¬Å“overlapping
consensus ¢â‚¬  between Shari ¢â‚¬Ëœa and constitutionalism ¢â‚¬”one that gives warrant for
the exercise of  ¢â‚¬Å“unsupervised reason. ¢â‚¬ 

———-

*Sightings* comes from the Martin Marty
Center<http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/>at the University of
Chicago Divinity School.

Submissions policy

*Sightings* welcomes submissions of 500 to 750 words in length that seek to
illuminate and interpret the intersections of religion and politics, art,
science, business and education. Previous
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The editor also encourages new approaches to current issues and events.

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