WEA-RLC Research and Analysis Report
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June 13, 2011

A recent spate of violence in Egypt, mostly incited by conservative
Salafi Muslims after President Hosni Mubarak ¢â‚¬â„¢s downfall, has left over
24 killed, more than 200 wounded and three churches destroyed. The
perception of threat to the Christians is so severe that many of them
are reportedly seeking to move out of the country.

While for the youth and moderate Muslims of this country the January 25
uprising was about democratic freedoms, the Salafis who had been
inactive for decades promptly saw it as an opportunity to push an
Islamist agenda.

Sectarian violence, mostly against Coptic Christians, escalated amid a
debate on the role of religion in politics that began following the
departure of Mubarak and picked up pace after the announcement of a
referendum to adopt an interim constitution (mainly amendment to the
1971 constitution) paving the way for a democratic election. The bone of
contention was Article 2 of the previous constitution which stated that
Islam was the state religion and legislation must be based on the
principles of Islamic law. This Article was retained in the draft
constitution and insulated against the voting and yet there were
apprehensions.

Islamists thought if Egyptians were to reject the draft constitution, a
new one would have to be drawn up from scratch which might not include
the content of Article 2. Liberal Egyptians, who see Islam mainly as a
form of private faith, feared that the retention of the Article could
lead to discrimination against Coptic Christians and other minorities  ¢â‚¬“
more than they experienced during Mubarak ¢â‚¬â„¢s regime.

In the March 19 referendum, a majority said  ¢â‚¬Ëœyes ¢â‚¬â„¢ to the amendments and
the interim constitution was adopted. However, the debate is not over
yet. The Salafist struggle for the formation of a more conservative
state carries on.

Salafis read the Quran literally and seek to maintain a lifestyle that
replicates early Islam in the days of Mohammed. They follow the
/salaf/, Muhammad ¢â‚¬â„¢s 7^th century companions, and reject later movements
as heresy. They believe in banning alcohol, the  ¢â‚¬Å“mixing of sexes ¢â‚¬  and
Christian worship. It is believed that they are being guided and funded
by their counterparts in Saudi Arabia.

Before Mubarak ¢â‚¬â„¢s departure, Salafis would do little more than preaching
and were known for dismissing democracy as un-Islamic  ¢â‚¬“ but they would
not call for a revolt. But now, they have taken a U-turn. They seem to
have concluded that it is easier to establish an Islamic state through
elections. They have founded a political party, Al Nour, and backed the
Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt ¢â‚¬â„¢s most organised political group, during the
March 19 referendum for the interim constitution.

In April, when Egypt ¢â‚¬â„¢s military establishment, now the new government,
appointed a Christian as the new governor of the Qena Governorate to
replace the previous official who was also a Christian, the Salafis
raised a hue and cry saying a Christian could not be given authority of
Muslims. They demanded that a Muslim governor be appointed. In March, a
Salafi leader, al-Hosseini Kamal, a suspected terrorist, had cut off the
ear of a 45 year old Christian Coptic man, Ayman Anwar Mitri, in Qena.
Kamal was one of the thousands of terror suspects who were released from
detention after the revolution.

The provocations of the Salafis seem to be aimed at mobilising Egyptian
Muslims. For that ¢â‚¬â„¢s the easiest and fastest way to gain support from
conservative sections of the Muslim community.

The Salafis cannot be expected to do well in the parliamentary election
expected in September, but its sectarian activities are helping other
religious groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which claims to be a
moderate Islamist party and promise equality to Coptic Christians, to
garner support. The Salafi violence makes the Muslim Brotherhood appear
more mainstream, more tolerant and a saner option to the voter at a time
when other political groups are still struggling to organise themselves.

Salafi leaders have also said they would partner with the Muslim
Brotherhood to field Islamist candidates for the election.

One of the reasons why Salafi violence is not being dealt with strictly
is that it is helping the military leaders, who have been eyeing a
larger financial aid from the United States in the wake of Mubarak ¢â‚¬â„¢s
downfall. Any possibility of an Islamist party coming to power makes
Washington nervous and therefore more generous towards to transitional
government.

Giving in to pressure by the protesting Salafis, the military government
on April 25 announced on national television that Qena ¢â‚¬â„¢s new
(Christian) governor ¢â‚¬â„¢s appointment had been stayed for three months and
the deputy governor, a Muslim, would temporarily act as the governor.
This sent a wrong signal to the Salafis that they can arm-twist the
government, which claims it can no longer curb any  ¢â‚¬Å“public ¢â‚¬  rally lest
it be seen as  ¢â‚¬Å“authoritarian. ¢â‚¬ 

There are many other obstacles.

Egypt ¢â‚¬â„¢s media has been co-opted by the Salafis as they are being covered
widely and their voices featured in news which further emboldens them.
Some newspapers and news channels go to the extent of reporting on
rumours which often result in violence.

Laws that help Islamists to incite violence also remain intact. Egyptian
law makes it difficult for Christians to build places of worship while
Muslims can construct theirs without much regulation. As a result, many
new churches use their buildings officially meant for other purposes for
worship which causes tensions. Also, the authorities use Article 98(f)
of the Penal Code, the blasphemy law, to restrict evangelism efforts.

Besides, the Salafis are not an officially organised group without any
provision for membership. Therefore, dealing with the movement is
difficult, as only the individuals held responsible for an action can be
prosecuted, which, too, happens rarely. Moreover, values such as
secularism, justice and freedom are seen as  ¢â‚¬Å“Western imperialism, ¢â‚¬  and
therefore difficult to promote. Furthermore, sectarian violence mostly
takes place in regions where poverty prevails and where most people
follow their religious leaders almost blindly  ¢â‚¬“ particularly in
provincial towns in southern Egypt.

While there are always triggers of violence, the causes of the divide
among sections of majority Muslims and minority Christians, who make up
about 10 percent of Egypt ¢â‚¬â„¢s 80 million people, are rooted in history.
Christianity in Egypt predates Islam but by the 10^th century, the
Christians were reduced to a minority. While the  ¢â‚¬Å“Hamayouni Decree ¢â‚¬ 
brought some equality in 1856, discrimination against the Christians
returned with the Nasser Revolution of 1952 and remained in place for
decades.

Solutions to the problem of sectarianism should be sought keeping these
complexities in mind.

First and foremost, the transitional government should be pushed to
ensure institutional equality for the minorities. And Washington is
currently best positioned to do so by linking its aid to sincere
political and economic reforms and human rights and freedoms.

The Egyptian government must be asked to prevent the Salafis from
receiving funding from abroad and enjoying impunity. And an effort
should be made towards an institutional protection for Christians
/before/ the election. If it is left to the regime that comes following
the election, which is likely to be dominated by Islamists, there will
be little hope for equality.

The military rulers should also be urged to engage the country ¢â‚¬â„¢s elite  ¢â‚¬“
politicians, the intelligentsia, Islamists, and Coptic leaders  ¢â‚¬“ in
discussions to address grievances and persuade them to refrain from any
provocation. The government has made attempts earlier, but not
wholeheartedly.

Let us help prevent conditions that can cause an exodus of Egypt’s
Christians.